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the vendor petroleum company had not extinguished the 1931
servitude prior to the sale. In view of the Tritico decision and
the broad estoppel applied in the original opinion in the instant
case, defendant argued that it was put "in the position of having
lost both sides of the same question." 15 After conceding the
correctness of this contention, the court held that the estoppel
applied in the original hearing was too broad. Since plaintiff
had agreed to a mineral reservation in the deed, the court con-
cluded that the petroleum company would not have been estopped
from asserting the 1931 servitude during the 10 years following
the sale. However, after that period the petroleum company
was estopped from asserting the interruption of prescription
by drilling which had occurred on contiguous lands. The
rationale of the decision was that Hodges should not be placed
at a disadvantage because he had no notice that a mineral
servitude existed on the land at the time he bought. Likewise,
he should not be allowed to escape the existence of a charge
against the land during the 10 years following the sale because
he assented to a mineral reservation. By applying the doctrine





Some interesting and novel questions were presented to the
court in the case of Da~um v. Lehde.' Plaintiff was the purchaser
in a contract by which the defendant agreed to sell certain im-
proved real estate. Prior to the completion and delivery of the
act of sale the improvements were partially destroyed by fire. It
appears that the defendant rejected the plaintiff's demand that
he transfer the property to plaintiff together with his interest
in a fire insurance policy on the improvements. Plaintiff then
sued claiming alternatively (1) the delivery of the property in
substantially its condition before the fire; (2) the delivery of
the property in its damaged condition together with the sum re-
15. Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 840 (La. 1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 607, 119 So.2d 481 (1960).
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ceived covering the insurance; (3) the delivery of the property
in its damaged condition less $12,000.00, representing the
amount necessary to restore the property to its former condi-
tion; (4) the return of double the deposit. The district court's
judgment awarding the plaintiff a simple return of the amount
deposited was affirmed. The court found without merit the de-
mand that defendant restore the property. It rejected plaintiff's
claim for the property plus the insurance money by finding that
Article 2220 of the Civil Code on which plaintiff relied applies
only to claims sounding in tort and not to a claim founded on a
contract of insurance. It found that plaintiff's claim for an al-
lowance on the purchase price on the basis of Article 2455 of
the Civil Code was not timely made.
Three basic situations may be presented where property
which is the subject of a sales agreement is destroyed in whole
or in part without the fault of either party. (1) It may be so
destroyed, unknown to the parties, at the moment it is sold. This
situation seems to be controlled by Article 2455. It provides that
the buyer may either abandon the sale, or retain the preserved
part, by having the price thereof determined by appraisement.
(2) The property may be so destroyed after a contract for its
sale has been formed but before the occurrence of a condition
which suspends the transfer of ownership. This situation is con-
trolled by Article 2044. It expressly provides that the buyer may
either elect to dissolve his obligation to take it and pay the price,
or he may "require the thing in the state in which it is, without
diminution of the price." (3) The property may be so destroyed
after it has been sold but before it has been delivered. In this
event, Article 2155 is controlling. Under it, since ownership has
passed to the buyer with its accompanying risk, the only obliga-
tion of the debtor is to deliver the thing in the state in which it
then is. The buyer must, of course, pay the price. However,
under Article 2220, if the seller has any claim for indemnifica-
tion, he must make it over to the creditor.
On the basis of this analysis, inasmuch as in the present case
the transfer of ownership, or sale, was suspended pending the
execution and delivery of an act of sale, Article 2044 was con-
trolling rather than Article 2455. This being true, the buyer had
no claim to the insurance money or to a reduction in the price.
He could either withdraw, or take the thing without diminution
of the price, as the former provides. Since the court's opinion
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rejected the buyer's claim to the thing at a reduced price, the
result seems certainly correct. However, this result was reached
on the assumption that Article 2455 applied and because the
buyer did not make his demand "prior to or at the time set for
the sale" rather than because he had no such right. Of course, if
Article 2455 is applicable to such a case, this method of dispos-
ing of the claim was in order. But the language of the article
indicates that it applies to a sale rather than to an agreement
under which the sale is suspended until some later event, which
was the kind of transaction before the court inasmuch as the
transfer of ownership was suspended pending the delivery of an
act of sale. It refers to "the thing sold" and deals with its de-
struction "at the moment of the sale." It provides that the pur-
chaser may "retain" - because ownership has passed - the pre-
served part by having the price thereof determined by appraise-
ment. Furthermore, if Article 2455 be construed to apply to a
case where the transfer of ownership is suspended, it would be
in conflict with Article 2044.
It appears, also, that Article 2220, notwithstanding some ex-
pressions to the contrary by French writers, likewise applies to
a case where the transfer of ownership has already taken place
at the time the loss occurs although the thing has not yet been
delivered. It is, in effect, a continuation of the preceding article
which deals expressly with the loss of the "certain and deter-
minate substance which was the object of the obligation." This
is language customarily employed in the Code where there is
agreement for the sale of a specific, identified thing, at a fixed
price. In such a case, there being a concurrence of thing, price,
and consent, under the French code and our Article 2456 as well,
the sale is perfected and the property in the thing is acquired
of right by the purchaser.2 Furthermore, the official discussions
of the projet of the Code Napoleon show conclusively that Ar-
ticles 1302 and 1303 of that Code (our Articles 2219 and 2220)
deal with a perfected sale and contain reflections of the rule res
petit domino and its exceptions. Although the language of Ar-
ticle 1303 is not too exact, the discussions also show that the
theory of the draftsmen was that since the thing belongs to the
buyer, i.e., since ownership has passed, any right to indemnifica-
tion for its loss belongs to him.8 It is also to be noted that the
2. An act of sale translative of ownership is required by our jurisprudence
in cases involving immovables. See Peck v. Bemis, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855).
3. In the official communication to the Tribunal, Tribune Favart explained
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article merely says that the seller is bound "if he has any claim"
for indemnification, to make it over to the buyer. And, finally,
the application of this article to a case where the transfer of
ownership is suspended and the loss occurs prior to the occur-
rence of the suspensive condition, would create an apparent con-
flict with Article 2044. It seems reasonable to believe that if
the lawmaker had intended to say that where title has not passed
to the buyer - the situation dealt with in Article 2044 - the
buyer could either withdraw, or take the thing without any dimi-
nution of the price, as therein stated, or could take the thing and
require the seller to make over to him any claim that he may
have for its destruction, the latter would have been said in the
same article or at least at the same place in the Code. Maybe
this ought to be the law, but, if so, the Code seems to be against
it.4
In Poche v. Ruiz" the court followed its recent holding in a
similar case6 and gave judgment for a purchaser for a return of
double the amount deposited by him in connection with a con-
tract to purchase an immovable although the defendant's failure
these provisions, in part, as follows: "When the thing has perished or is lost with-
out the debtor being responsible as provided by the law, he is bound only to cede
to the creditor the rights or actions in indemnity to which the loss may give rise.
The same principles should apply in the case where the thing has been taken out
of commerce. I have sold to Jean three arpents of land that I am not bound to
deliver for a month; before the month the public authority takes one of the three
arpents for a railway; I am not then obligated to deliver this arpent. As to this
arpent, the obligation is extinguished; but the indemnity that the government pays
should accrue to Jean. The debtor is not bound to make any step or move; he is
obligated only to cede his rights and actions to his creditor." 8 FENET, RECUEIL
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PR]tPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 368 (1836).
And Tribune Mouricault, in explaining the draft to the legislative corps, said
of Articles 1302 and 1303: "The loss of the thing due is a sixth cause of 'the
extinction of the obligation. When the thing perishes, is taken out of commerce,
or is lost in such a manner that its existence may be disregarded, the obligation
is extinguished if this is without the fault of the debtor, if he is not charged
with fortuitous events, and if he is not in default. Even when he is in default
if he is not charged with fortuitous events, the obligation is destroyed when the
thing would have perished also in the hands of the creditor. For the rest, the
debtor must prove the fortuitous event he alleges, and, when he is not bound, he
has only to preserve what remains of the thing or the actions and indemnities
that replace it; all of this belongs of right to the creditor like the thing itself
which it is no longer possible to give him." Id. at 438.
4. The draftsmen of our Code repeated the provisions of Article 2044 in
Article 2471 without again indicating that the buyer should be entitled to claim
any cause of action that might have accrued to the seller against any third party
responsible for the destruction of the thing prior to the satisfaction of a suspen-
sive condition. It might well be asked also why, if the buyer would be entitled
to claim such a cause of action in the event of partial destruction of the thing
he should not be entitled to claim the same in the event of its total destruction.
These articles provide merely that in the latter case "the obligation is extin-
guished" and "the loss is sustained by the seller."
5. 239 La. 573, 119 So.2d 469 (1960).
6. Ducuy v. Falgoust, 228 La. 533, 83 So.2d 118 (1955).
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to convey a clear title was occasioned by a pending lawsuit. As
in the earlier case, the holding was based on a contract pro-
vision which was found to provide for the recovery allowed.
However, the opinion also referred as with approval to an inter-
mediate holding to like effect in a case where as far as the opin-
ion shows no such contract provision was involved.7 The broader
base of the latter case seems to be entirely supportable." Of
course, the parties could contract so as to relieve the seller of the
risk of being unable to convey a valid title but the instant case
disclosed no facts strong enough to support such a conclusion.
An effort on the part of the purchaser to show that an additional
payment made ten days after the payment of the initial ten per-
cent should be counted as part of the deposit for the purpose of
computing the amount due him was rejected. This additional
amount was treated by the court as simply the payment by the
purchaser of the full cash portion of the purchase price, a posi-
tion fully sustained by the facts.
The question of whether title had passed to a trade-in auto-
mobile was presented to the court in Jackson Motors, Inc. v.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co.9 On its resolution depended recovery
under a policy of fire insurance. The conclusion of the court
based on a careful examination of the facts was that the loss
occurred prior to the transfer of ownership which had been sub-
jected to a suspensive condition which remained unsatisfied at
such time. In short, the sale of the new car on which the buyer's
old car was to be taken in trade was suspended under the agree-
ment until the buyer's credit had been approved by a finance
company. The evidence failed to establish that the credit had
been approved and notification thereof given prior to the fire.
In consequence, the buyer's insurable interest had not been lost
and a right of action against the insurer accrued in his favor.
Insofar as the agreement for the delivery of the old car by way
of trade-in was concerned, it amounted to an exchange, but
transfer of ownership to the thing exchanged is governed by
the same rules that govern the ordinary contract of sale.10
Where two of four plaintiffs transferred their interests in a
7. Caplan v. Airport Properties, 231 La. 1071, 93 So.2d 661 (1957).
8. See Smith, Recovery of Damages for Non-Delivery and Eviction in Lou-
isiana-A Comparison, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 253 (1957); The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Conventional Obligations,
18 LOuiSIANA LAW REVIEW 39, 40-41 (1957).
9. 239 La. 921, 120 So.2d 478 (1960).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2667 (1870).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
certain suit pending an appeal thereon by the defendant, the
latter's motion for a remand in order to exercise the right of
litigious redemption was granted notwithstanding a delay of two
months after notification of the transfers. Under the circum-
stances of the case the motion was found not untimely. The
court undertook to protect the remaining plaintiffs against un-
due delay resulting from a remand by retaining the appeal in
its position on the preference docket. In addition, the trial judge
was instructed to hear the evidence on the remand as soon as
possible." When the case was returned to the Supreme Court,
it concluded that the negotiations between the parties had never
ripened into an enforceable contract for lack of agreement be-
tween them.'2
In Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co."3 it was held that since
the vendors of a tract of land warranted the vendee against all
legal claims and demands whatsoever, except those expressly re-
served and excepted, they were estopped to assert rights stem-
ming from a former mineral reservation not declared in the act
of sale in question. Application of the principle was amply sup-
ported by the facts.
The court in Jones v. Jones14 found inapplicable the doctrine
that where the co-owner of property purchases it at a tax sale,
the purchase inures to the benefit of all of the co-owners. The
evidence established that the purchase of the property by the co-
owner occurred not at the tax sale but from a third party who
purchased at the tax sale and after the period of redemption had
expired. The third party was found to be not an agent or repre-
sentative of the former owners, and not an interposed party. No
relationship of trust was established between the purchasing co-
owner and the others inasmuch as he was not in possession of
the property at the time the taxes were due. Hence no basis
was found for the application of the equitable doctrine on which
the plaintiff was relying.
The plaintiff in Wood v. Police Jury of the Parish of Jeffer-
son'5 lost his suit to recover the value of certain lots which he
claimed to have redeemed after their adjudication to the state
11. Clement v. Sneed Brothers, 238 La. 614, 116 So.2d 269 (1959).
12. 240 La. 48, 121 So.2d 235 (1960). The case is favorably noted in 20
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 787 (1960).
13. 240 La. 198, 121 So.2d 831 (1960).
14. 240 La. 174, 121 So.2d 734 (1960).
15. 240 La. 1, 121 So.2d 218 (1960).
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for unpaid taxes, because he did not show that he made the pay-
ment to the treasurer of the state required by R.S. 47:2224
where more than three years have elapsed since the adjudication
of the property to the state. His claim that he had satisfied all
conditions entitling him to a certificate of redemption from the
Register of the State Land Office by the payment of all of the
taxes and costs due to the Tax Collector of Jefferson Parish, in
keeping with the prevailing custom in the parish, was found
without merit on the ground that such a custom cannot prevail
over positive law.
In 1955 the court held in the case of Koerber v. New Or-
leans'6 that, where a public authority having the power of emi-
nent domain takes possession of the property of another by mis-
take without undertaking to expropriate it legally, the value of
the property is to be determined as of the time of the expropria-
tion which, in that case, took place when the city filed its answer
to plaintiff's suit for the value of the land. Justices McCaleb and
Hawthorne dissented. Their view was that the value of the land
should be measured as of the time of the actual taking of the
property. The taking for a public purpose was considered by
them as not being an illegal act but the establishment of a servi-
tude, and they contended that the compensation for the taking
should be fixed as of the date of the servitude's creation. Dur-
ing the last term the court in A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Com-
missioners for Pontchartrain Levee District7 found the rule of
the Koerber case not controlling. This was on the ground that
in the instant case the owner had full knowledge that his prop-
erty had been taken and did nothing about it. Hence it was held
that he should not be permitted to reclaim it and should be re-
stricted to a claim for compensation based on the value of the
property at the time of the actual taking. Although a consider-
able period of time had elapsed between the actual taking and
the claim of expropriation in the Koerber case, the court ex-
plained that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the taking for
three years and thereafter carried on negotiations with the city
for another period of three years before resorting to suit. This
explanation of the Koerber case seems to be a proper restriction
of the holding therein.
16. 228 La. 903, 84 So.2d 454 (1955).
17. 238 La. 926, 117 So.2d 60 (1960).
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EXPROPRIATION
Of the ten cases examined involving expropriation proceed-
ings, eight of them were concerned primarily with problems of
valuation. Of this latter number, six involved simply the ap-
plication of such well-known principles as that the proper
measure of the owner's recovery is the market value of the
property taken; that this means the price which would be agreed
upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and
a purchaser willing to buy; that the best guide to a determina-
tion of market value is comparable sales; that where no com-
parable sales are available the court may consider other factors
such as replacement cost less depreciation and the extrinsic
value or value to the owner. The cases recognize also that
severance damages are recoverable and that the measure thereof
is the difference between the market value of the remaining
property immediately before and immediately after the expro-
priation.1 The remaining two cases dealt with the question of
whether a landowner, part of whose property is expropriated
for highway purposes, is entitled to an award which includes
assessments to be made for street improvements and sidewalks.
In the first case, New Orleans v. Giraud,2 the amount recovered
included the cost of constructing sidewalks. In the second,
Shreveport v. Worley,3 an owner's claim to compensation to
cover a projected assessment for the construction of sidewalks
and the re-paving of the street was disallowed. In the Worley
case the court explained the allowance of the cost of constructing
sidewalks in the Giraud case by saying that the city did not con-
test the claim, and pointed out that recovery for street paving
was not passed upon because there was no evidence to show that
the street was to be paved and an assessment levied to cover
the cost. It concluded, therefore, that the court was not called
upon in the Giraud case to make any determination concerning
the existence of a right under such circumstances to recover the
cost of sidewalks or paving, and held that no such recovery is
legally permissible. This was put on the ground that since, under
the law, municipalities may levy assessments on abutting prop-
1. State v. Barber, 238 La. 587, 115 So.2d 864 (1959); State v. Barrow,
238 La. 887, 116 So.2d 703 (1959) ; State v. Esnard, 238 La. 903, 117 So.2d 52
(1960); State v. Central Realty Investment Co., 238 La. 965, 117 So.2d 261
(1960) State v. Havard, 239 La. 133, 118 So.2d 131 (1960) ; State v. Hub Realty
,Co., 239 La. 154, 118 So.2d 364 (1960).
2. 238 La. 278, 115 So.2d 349 (1959).
S. 240 La. 117, 121 So.2d 506 (1960).
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erty for street improvements without regard to any benefit or
detriment which may result therefrom, the mere fact that the
improvements are to be made in part on land taken for such
purposes will not support a recovery by the property owner of
the costs assessed against him.
The court had two opportunities further to determine the
standing of lessees in condemnation proceedings but declined to
do so in both instances. In the case of State v. Schnitt,4 the court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the Department of High-
ways, acting pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 48:441-460, must
deposit separate sums to cover the interests of the owner and
the lessee. Because the lessee had been made a party, it likewise
declined to decide whether or not a lessee is a necessary party
in condemnation proceedings. It referred, however, to a previous
holding that a lessee is not an improper party. In State v. Sum-
rall,5 the court again found it unnecessary to determine whether
or not the Department of Highways must deposit separate sums
to cover the interests of owners and lessees.
LEASE
A lessee must prove that the lessor is responsible for a fire on
the leased premises in order to recover against the latter for a
loss resulting therefrom. At the same time, if bailed goods are
destroyed while in the possession of the bailee, he must prove
that there was no lack of due care on his part. An application of
these rules in Brown & Blackwood v. Ricou-Brewster Building
Co.' resulted in a judgment for the lessor and a remand of the
case on the depositor's claim against the lessee, as depositary, to
cover the loss of a painting loaned to the latter for display pur-
poses.
4. 238 La. 1069, 117 So.2d 595 (1960).
5. 240 La. 147, 121 So.2d 724 (1960).
1. 239 La. 1037, 121 So.2d 70 (1960).
